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Do LGBT workplace diversity policies create value for firms? 
 
Abstract 
We show that U.S. anti-discriminatory laws prohibiting discrimination in the workplace based 
on sexual orientation and gender identity (i.e. lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
identities) spur innovation, which ultimately leads to higher firm performance. We use the 
Human Rights Campaign’s Corporate Equality Index (CEI) of 398 (1,592 firm-year 
observations) U.S. firms between 2011 and 2014, and find a significantly positive relationship 
between CEI and firm innovation. We also find that an interacting effect of CEI and firm 
innovation leads to higher firm performance. We use our understanding of Rawls’ Theory of 
Justice and stakeholder theory to show that firms with workplace diversity policies are likely 
to be more innovative and perform better than those without such policies. Our results are 
robust to endogeneity, reverse causality and simultaneity issues. Our results will trigger debate 
in similar markets around the globe on the economic benefits of LGBT workplace diversity 
policies for firms.   
 
Keywords: Workplace diversity, LGBT, Innovation, Firm performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 | P a g e  
 
1 Introduction  
Support for LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender, hereafter LGBT) rights has 
increased substantially over the last two decades in Australia, UK, USA, and other European 
countries (Lloren & Parini, 2017; Pichler, Blazovich, Cook, Huston, & Strawser, 2018). 
Consequently, corporate equality initiatives, and more specifically, employee equality 
initiatives are becoming an integral part of firms’ diversity management. These initiatives 
signal an open and tolerant workplace environment in which employees are not discriminated 
against on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity.1 Liddle, Luzzo, Hauenstein, 
& Schuck (2004) emphasize that workplace environment plays a key role in employee 
recruitment, productivity, stress and commitment. It is estimated that approximately eight 
million people, or 3.5% of the U.S population, identify as LGBT (Gates, 2011, 2012) and 30 
states have no laws protecting the employment rights of LGBT individuals (Webster, Adams, 
Maranto, Sawyer, & Thoroughgood, 2018). Research has shown that individuals who identify 
as LGBT face discrimination, hostility and negative attitudes (homophobia and transphobia) in 
the workplace, which negatively affects their performance on the job in terms of higher 
absenteeism and lower productivity (Bonaventura & Biondo, 2016).  
To improve the workplace environment, in 2017, the U.N. High Commissioner for 
human rights released new standards of conduct to eliminate discrimination against LGBT 
employees in the workplace.2 These anti-discriminatory policies have both societal and 
economic benefits. For example, formal acceptance of LGBT employees in the workplace 
makes them feel less anxious, less threatened, and more comfortable (Liddle et al., 2004). In 
terms of economic benefits, in Australia, it has been estimated that acceptance of secluded 
                                                          
1
 The extant literature from various fields, including history, sociology, and psychology, concurs that 
discrimination against LGBT groups exists because of both sexual orientation and gender identity (e.g. Badgett, 
1995; Drydakis, 2009; King & Cortina, 2010; Ozeren, 2014; Bonaventura & Biondo, 2016). 
2
 These standards include respect, elimination and prevention of discrimination, support, and taking a stand for 
LGBT individuals. 
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workers in different workplaces could lead to as much as $285 million in savings per year 
nationally, an increase of 11% in staff retention and 30% in productivity (Johnson & Cooper, 
2015). At the organizational level, acceptance of LGBT groups increases the pool of talent 
from which organizations may draw strategic benefits, and such inclusion leads to an increase 
in diversity in different positions and professional teams within the organization (Barbulescu 
& Bidwell, 2013). However, although promoters of LGBT supportive policies argue that these 
enhance the talent pool and improve firm level diversity, very little attention has been paid to 
whether these policies create value for firms. 
To recognise the economic effects of LGBT workplace policies, this paper focuses on 
the effect of LGBT workplace policies3 in value creation for firms. A growing number of 
studies have focused on the social imperative of workplace policies, i.e., discrimination and 
LGBT workplace policies (Ragins & Cornwell, 2001; Priola, Lasio, De Simone, & Serri, 2014), 
diversity and LGBT workplace policies (Ozturk & Tatli, 2016), stigma in the workplace and 
LGBT workplace policies (Ragins, 2008), and politics and LGBT workplace policies (Gupta, 
Briscoe & Hambrick, 2017; Rhodes, 2017). However, only a limited number of studies have 
focused on the economic imperative of workplace policies, i.e., firm performance and LGBT 
workplace policies (Shan & Zheng, 2017; Pichler et al., 2017, 2018). In this paper, we seek to 
investigate the impact of LGBT workplace policies on firms’ innovation, and ultimately on 
firm performance.  
We use Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1971) to explain ethical corporate behaviour, social 
responsibility, societal fairness and equality (Chapman, 1975). This theory points to fairness 
as a social good and suggests that institutions (in this case, firms) have a responsibility and an 
                                                          
3
 LGBT workplace policy is measured through the Corporate Equality Index (CEI), which is published annually 
by Human Rights Campaign (HRC), the largest organisation for LGBT rights in the U.S. This index rates the 
firms from 0 to 100 points with 100 as highest score based on different sub-policies (e.g. sexual orientation non-
discrimination policies, domestic partner benefits policies, workplace training and LGBT supportive policy 
guidelines). 
4 | P a g e  
 
opportunity to demonstrate how to treat others (in this case, employees) fairly. The theory 
further specifies that fairness should not be contingent upon socio-demographic characteristics. 
Instead, fairness at the workplace should be rooted within a workers’ meritocracy. Prior 
literature that has confirmed Rawls’ (1971) concept of fairness and its value to organizational 
outcomes is limited to some specific socio-demographic factors, i.e. race and religion (Beckley 
1986; Cohen, 2010). To date, no research on Rawls’ (1971) contribution is extended 
specifically to the fairness of LGBT employees in the workplace. We apply the Theory of 
Justice to the challenges faced by the LGBT community, and show how transparent corporate 
communication that reflects fairness, i.e., LGBT supportive workplace policies, may have 
implications for organizational outcomes. Moreover, we use stakeholder theory, which builds 
on the premise that all firms’ stakeholders should be treated fairly and equally (Fieseler, Fleck, 
& Meckel, 2010), to demonstrate that firms, through transparent corporate communication, 
create value for stakeholders, which ultimately adds value to the firm. 
 To empirically answer our research question, we use data from the Human Rights 
Campaign (HRC) that provide information on firms’ overall Corporate Equality Index (CEI) 
score, sexual orientation non-discrimination policies, gender identity non-discrimination 
policies, domestic partner benefits, and transgender policies from 2011–2014. We find a 
significant positive relationship between the CEI score and individual policies with firms’ 
levels of innovation, which ultimately positively affect firm performance.  
Our study may face critique on potential endogeneity bias due to the causal effect of 
CEI on innovation. For instance, a manager who is sensitive to the benevolent effects of 
corporate social equality may hire more LGBT employees by implementing LGBT supportive 
workplace policies that will ultimately improve firm innovation. On the other hand, firms keen 
on innovation may also be responsive to external and societal expectation in terms of 
implementing LGBT workplace policies. We employ two techniques to minimize these 
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endogeneity concerns: propensity score matching and dynamic panel estimation (Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM)). Our results are robust to these sensitivity techniques and to 
alternate proxies of firm innovation.  
Our contribution to the existing literature is two-fold. First, we contribute to the 
literature on Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1971) by extending its construct of fairness to LGBT 
employees and policies in the workplace that create value for organizations. Second, we 
provide empirical evidence to support our arguments on how LGBT workplace policies 
positively affect firm outcomes. More specifically, we contribute to the existing literature by 
investigating the actual driver of value-addition, i.e., firm innovation. Previous studies that 
found a positive association between LGBT workplace policies and firm performance failed to 
provide a channel through which these policies may have an impact on firm performance. In 
this study, we confirm the argument that LGBT workplace policies improve firm performance 
through innovation. Our study is also timely and supports the upsurge in calls for LGBT rights 
in workplaces around the globe. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the intra-
relationship between workplace diversity management policies, accounting and innovation. 
Section 3 discusses the theory and develops hypothesis. Section 4 presents the research design. 
Section 5 reports our empirical results and discussion. Section 6 presents our conclusions, 
including the implications of our findings and the limitations of our research. 
2 Workplace diversity management, accounting and innovation: 
With respect to the workplace, diversity refers to the co-existence of employees from 
various socio-cultural backgrounds. The equal opportunity philosophy is aimed at ensuring that 
organizations make the most out of the uniqueness of a diverse workforce, which might assist 
the organization to be more efficient and effective, rather than losing talent. Broadly, diversity 
management is the systematic and planned commitment by an organization to recruit, retain, 
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reward and promote a heterogeneous mix of employees (Grobler et al., 2006). Nowadays, for 
many leading businesses, it is a strategic imperative to create a culture of inclusion and diversity 
that extends to LGBT people: they know that it correlates to greater individual performance 
and ultimately, stronger business performance. For example, 85% of Fortune 500 businesses 
have explicit policies against discrimination based on sexual orientation, and 49% include 
gender identity (Kelly, 2016). Prior studies have found that various forms of diversity are 
associated with greater innovation, improved strategic decision making, and better outcomes 
when innovation and complex problem-solving are required (Jackson & Joshi, 2004; Francoeur 
et al., 2008; Omankhanlen and Ogaga, 2011).  
Hopwood (1987) states that ‘Accounting is not a static phenomenon’ (p. 207). Over 
time, accounting has been implicated in the creation of very different patterns of organizational 
segmentation (Hopwood, 1987). If accounting is a machine (Burchell, Clubb, Hopwood, 
Hughes, & Nahapiet, 1980), it is a mechanical procedure that offers propositions about 
problems to be concerned with in the future (Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016). Therefore, 
accounting is relevant in many different situations. When decision making is considered as a 
rational procedure, accounting is understood as an answering machine calculating the 
economic consequences of various decision alternatives (Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016). If 
decision making is understood in less rational terms, accounting may play a much more 
complex role, as a learning, ammunition and rationalization machine (Stambaugh & Carpenter, 
1992; Palincsar, 1998; Mouritsen & Kreiner, 2016). On the other hand, the accounting 
information also creates conditions for the possibility of the emergence of a new interpretation 
of the organization’s activities, new criteria for action and managerial structures (Dent 1990; 
Ezzamel & Bourn, 1990). Indeed, it is a general belief that greater transparency is a prerequisite 
for developing more useful accounting information, as well as improved organizational 
accountability (Roberts, 2009). In this case, our assumption is that corporate accounting 
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information is largely embedded within the corporate strategies that are taken by the board of 
directors in relation to corporate performance and human resource policy that required 
workplace contextual support for LBGT employees (Webster et al., 2018; Pichler et al., 2018). 
  It is established that in the case of workplace discrimination, employers limit their 
available talent pool by discriminating against qualified applicants because of their sexual 
orientation and/or gender identity (Tilcsik, 2011). Literature concurs that LGBT employees 
experience less discrimination when their employers have non-discrimination policies that 
include sexual orientation and gender identity, and are more amenable to the efforts of strategic 
outcomes and values of the organization (Schneider et al., 2013). Moreover, companies that 
are more diverse and inclusive are better able to compete, and have higher levels of innovation 
and creativity. In a global survey of companies with a turnover of more than $500 million, 85% 
agreed that workforce diversity encourages different perspectives, which drive innovation 
(Forbes Insights 2011). As diversity in the workplace is related to increased innovation, 
improved strategic decision making, and greater problem-solving skills within business teams 
(Jackson & Joshi, 2004; Francoeur et al., 2008), we can conclude that there is a relationship 
between workplace diversity management in relation to LGBT employees, accounting and 
innovation. LGBT-supportive workplace policies can bring about two specific benefits that can 
have a positive impact on the corporate bottom line (Sears & Mallory, 2011): retention of 
talented employees, and new ideas and innovation generated by drawing upon a diverse 
workforce with a wide range of characteristics. 
3 Theory and hypothesis development 
Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1971) 
Rawls’ (1971) Theory of Justice has received enormous attention from scholars in a 
wide range of disciplines (Chapman, 1975; Bond & Park, 1991). This theory offers a rational 
accommodation of freedom and equality (Chapman, 1975). It also provides a foundation, based 
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on the idea of fairness, which links the demands of justice to a more general mode of reasoning 
(Sen, 1995). The successful integration of the ideas of fairness, rationality, reasonableness, 
objectivity, and reflective equilibrium show Rawls’ theory of justice to be remarkably 
effective.  
The tolerance of gender inequality is closely related to notions of legitimacy and 
correctness (Sen, 1995). In theory, the State should guarantee the freedom and liberty of all its 
citizens, human rights, rule of law, participation, fairness and justice (Freeman, 2006; 
Petersmann, 2008). Firms should provide guarantees on what is essentially described as 
“equality of opportunity”, i.e., that there should be no discrimination (legal or de facto) against 
any group of people (or minority) based on the values and identity they uphold (De Hart, 1994; 
Gavrilovic, 2016).  
Rawls consistently points out that the organizational institution has the resources and 
the opportunity to treat others fairly, and to reward employees not according to a specific socio-
demographic factor such as race, religion or gender, but according to their merit, based on work 
competency within the institution (Rawls, 1971). Rawls also adds that because the institution 
has a unique opportunity to advance fairness and meritocratic values in society at large, a 
greater ethical imperative is placed upon the institution to do so (Rawls, 1971). The employees 
who work in a company also have a platform to advance the fairness principle in the workplace.  
Stakeholder Theory 
Researchers have long been interested in the process of social change through activist 
pressure on corporations (Briscoe, Chin, & Hambrick, 2014) in order to create an environment 
of equality, sometimes with specific reference to sexual orientation and gender identity policies 
in the workplace (Pichler et al., 2018). Other researchers investigate corporate disclosures and 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices, which are vehicles of communication between 
corporations and stakeholders. There are many theoretical perspectives on corporate 
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disclosures, many of which are closely tied to stakeholder theory (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; 
Pichler et al., 2018).  
The key proposition of stakeholder theory is that firms have a variety of stakeholders, 
who are affected by or affect firms’ outcomes (Freeman, 1984). It is important to include and 
represent the stakeholders and their interests within the firm because it is not only management 
who contribute to the success of an organization, but also stakeholders, such as customers, 
suppliers, and employees, who also make important contributions to the organization (Baker 
& Anderson, 2010). A limitation of stakeholder theory, as noted by Fieseler et al. (2010), is 
that it does not include ethical guidelines for communication and treating all stakeholders 
equally. The existing literature provides a rich discussion on how stakeholders are valued 
equally (or not) and how their interests are addressed (or not) within the organization (Turnbull, 
Greenwood, Tworoger, & Golden, 2011; Van Dijk, van Engen, & Paauwe, 2012). 
The commitment to diversity, equality and inclusiveness towards LGBT groups is an 
important aspect of CSR (Snider, Hill, & Martin, 2003; Colgan, 2011). Therefore, our 
assumption is that LGBT-supportive policies in a firm are increasingly important as part of 
workplace diversity management, which should be communicated in a transparent way to all 
stakeholders, for example through the CSR report. Stakeholders seek to shape equitable 
employment practices through negotiations inside organizations (Bidwell, Briscoe, Fernandez-
Mateo, & Sterling, 2013). Human Rights Campaign (HRC), the largest national LGBT civil 
rights organization in the USA, collected data based on an annual survey to rate U.S. firms on 
how they treated LGBT employees, with the compliance of pre-determined questions scoring 
a maximum of 100.4 This suggests that a pressure group like HRC, which is an example of a 
stakeholder, through its compiled Corporate Equality Index, can create value for other 
stakeholders, and ultimately for firms. From a stakeholder perspective, if a firm implements 
                                                          
4
 A detailed discussion has been included in the research design. 
10 | P a g e  
 
LGBT-supportive workplace policies, it provides a signal to potential employees and the 
market that the firm is socially responsible in terms of anti-discrimination policies and support 
for diversity (Theodorakopoulos & Budhwar, 2015; Pichler et al., 2018). 
Hypothesis development 
Innovation is an important determinant of firm-level competitiveness (Porter & Stern, 
2001) and is of interest to many stakeholders (Fang, Tian, & Tice, 2014). The literature on the 
business case for diversity builds on the assertion that diversity brings innovation, creativity 
and problem-solving skills (Østergaard, Timmermans, & Kristinsson, 2011). Research also 
indicates that LGBT-supportive workplace policies are increasingly important to employees 
regardless of their own sexual orientation and gender identity (Badgett et al., 2007; Cordes, 
2012). Although prior studies have linked LGBT-supportive workplace policies to a variety of 
social imperatives and firm outcomes, i.e., firm performance and stock returns, our study 
investigates the actual existence of value-addition (Hypothesis). In short, we believe that firms, 
through effective workplace diversity management (i.e., implementation of LGBT workplace 
policies) can improve their competitiveness in the market. Consistent with prior research on 
the importance of innovation to stakeholders and the positive effects of LGBT-supportive 
workplace policies on firm outcomes, we hypothesize: 
H: LGBT workplace policies are positively associated with firm innovation. 
4 Research design 
Our data on corporate workplace policies are collected manually from the Human 
Rights Campaign (HRC) annual reports that provide information on firms’ overall Corporate 
Equality Index (CEI) score, sexual orientation non-discrimination policies, gender identity 
non-discrimination policies, domestic partner benefits, and transgender policies from 2011–
2014. The HRC survey includes firms from Standard and Poor’s 500, Forbes’ list of the 200 
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largest privately held firms, and the Fortune 500 largest publicly traded firms.5 Prior research 
(e.g., Johnston and Malina, 2008; Wang and Schwarz, 2010, Shan, Fu, & Zheng, 2017) has 
used the HRC CEI scores to study the impact of LGBT-supportive corporate policies on firms’ 
outcomes (such as firm performance). We collect firm innovation, accounting and governance 
characteristics from Bloomberg that reports data on firm patents, trademarks, copyrights, 
research and development, board size, and leverage among others. Consistent with the previous 
studies (e.g., Chen, Leung, & Goergen, 2017), we match both data sets and require sample 
firm-years to have corporate workplace policies, governance, and accounting data in order to 
be included as part of the sample. Our final sample consists of 398 firms or 1,592 firm-year 
observations.  
Empirical model and variables 
To examine the impact of CEI on firm innovation, we estimate the following baseline 
model: 
,
 =  + (_),
 + (_ℎ ! !),
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 + #'∑(! )) !) + #*∑(+ )) !)
 + ,,
             
(1) 
We measure our dependent variable innovation as the number of patents, trademarks, 
and copyright (PTC) grants in a year. We choose our measurement of innovation based on 
several factors. First, this measurement shows the true economic value of innovation that has 
been created and recognized, through grants of patents, trademarks and copyrights in a year 
(Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005). Second, this measurement provides precise assessment of 
the outcome of a firm’s efforts and investment in innovation. Third, our measurement is based 
on innovation outcome rather than input (e.g., research and development expenditure). 
                                                          
5
 In 2002, the HRC (largest national LGBT civil rights organization in the USA) began conducting an annual 
survey to rate US firms on how they treat their LGBT employees, investors, and consumers. The HRC publishes 
an annual report on the Corporate Equality Index (CEI). 
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However, we also employ the input-based measurement of innovation, i.e., research and 
development expenditures (Ln_R&D) following Miller & Triana (2009). Other alternative 
measures of innovation include patents, trademarks and copyrights per employee, per sales 
(PTC/Emp, PTC/Sales), and research and development per sales (R&D/ Sales), respectively. 
The variable of interest in this study is workplace diversity policies. The HRC annual 
reports on the Corporate Equality Index rates a firm on a scale, ranging from 0 to 100, with 100 
being the highest equality.6 The measure includes not only the workplace diversity policies that 
the firm has in place, but also the training taking place, involvement with the LGBT 
community, and responsible citizenship of the firm. The rating criteria include points assigned 
to a firm according to whether its employment policies include sexual orientation, gender 
identity and diversity training, supportive gender transition guidelines, domestic partner 
insurance, and transgender wellness benefits. For example, according to 2014 criteria, a policy 
such as non-discrimination on sexual orientation earns 15 points, non-discrimination on gender 
identity earns 15 points, and partner health insurance earns 15 points. The point breakdown for 
diversity policies is publicly available. The HRC Corporate Equality Index has been commonly 
used by prior studies to investigate different firm level outcomes (e.g., Wang & Schwarz, 2010; 
Cook & Glass, 2016; Shan et al., 2017). In addition to CEI (the umbrella measure), we also 
employ a set of dummy variables to measure the individual policies. First, we employ dummy 
variable (SONDP) that equals 1 if a firm has a sexual orientation non-discrimination policy in 
place and 0 otherwise. Second, we use dummy variable (GINDP) that equals 1 if a firm has a 
gender identity non-discrimination policy in place, and 0 otherwise. Third, we assign dummy 
variable (DPB) that equals 1 if a firm has a domestic partner benefits policy in place, and 0 
                                                          
6The HRC asks the largest organizations to submit a survey for this index.  However, their compliance is voluntary, 
and organizations can also submit responses, if not asked by HRC. The HRC CEI measure includes a 
comprehensive set of sexual equality and gender identity policies and the measure is used by extant literature.  
However, we acknowledge that it may not be a perfect measure due to the likelihood of certain perceptions and 
limitations of this organisation (HRC). 
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otherwise. Finally, we employ dummy variable (TG) that equals 1 if a firm has a transgender 
benefits policy in place, and 0 otherwise. 
We use two types of control variables: corporate governance and firm characteristics. 
Our selection of control variables is based on prior studies (e.g., Cook & Glass, 2016; Chen et 
al., 2017). Chen et al. (2017) show that corporate board characteristics are also important 
determinants of corporate policies. Therefore, we include a variety of board-specific variables 
to capture the quality of corporate governance, such as board size (Bsize) (measured as the total 
number of directors on the board); CEO duality (Duality) serves as proxy for CEO power (a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is a chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise); board 
independence (Bind) is considered an effective monitoring tool (Fama & Jensen, 1983) to 
implement societal shifts towards the LGBT community, as board independence is more likely 
to promote workplace diversity policies (measured as the number of independent directors 
divided by the board size); and regular board meetings (Ln_bmeeting) which improve the 
board’s monitoring ability (Rutherford & Buchholtz, 2007) and tend to approve diversity 
supportive initiatives (measured as the log of the total number of board meetings held in a 
year).  
The firm characteristics include firm-specific variables, such as: size of the firm (Firm 
size), which is measured as the natural log of total assets; ROA, return on assets, which is a 
measure of financial health; and Leverage, which is measured as total debt (short- and long-
term) to total assets. Tobin’s q, a proxy for growth opportunities, is the ratio of the book value 
of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to the book value of 
assets. Inside ownership (Insideown), a proxy for internal ownership, is measured as shares 
held by insiders to total outstanding shares. Capex, a proxy for capital expenditure, is measured 
by total capital expenditure divided by total assets. 
[Insert Table 1 here]  
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To test our empirical model, we use ordinary least square (OLS) as the baseline method 
and include industry (based on two-digit codes of GICS industry sectors) and year effects. The 
standard errors are corrected for through the clustering of residuals at the firm level to control 
for heteroscedasticity and within-firm correlation in the residuals (Petersen, 2009).7 We also 
specify one-year lagged independent variables by replacing the contemporaneous variables in 
the regressions to mitigate the endogeneity concerns (Harford et al., 2008). The underlying 
rationale is that diversity policies and board characteristics require time to influence firm 
innovation. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics. The average of innovation measure (PTC) is 
420.245 (see Panel A in Table 2). Panel B shows workplace diversity policy measures. CEI has 
a 58.222 average value; about 89% of firm observations offer a sexual orientation non-
discrimination policy (SONDP); 61% of firm observations have a gender identity non-
discrimination policy (GINDP); domestic partner benefits are offered by 63% of firm 
observations (DPB); and only 32% of the firm observations have transgender benefits policies 
(TG). The CEI score indicates whether a firm fully supports policies or only does so 
symbolically. In our sample, 39% of all firm observations score 100 points, suggesting that 
these firms engage in the best practices with their LGBT employees and provide support to the 
LGBT and non-LGBT workforce in creating a respectful and conducive workplace 
environment for all. Panel C shows that on average, the board size (Bsize) is 11.051; CEO 
duality (Duality) has the mean value 0.547; board independence (Bind) is 82.322%; and the 
average number of board meetings (Ln_bmeeting) is 7.962. Panel D shows that size of the firm 
                                                          
7
 Generally, the fixed effects (FE) technique is suggested for panel data estimation in the presence of unobserved 
firm fixed effects (e.g. Pathan, 2009). However, this method (FE) may not be suitable for this study because it 
requires substantial variation in the variables to generate consistent and unbiased estimates. In our study, the 
variable of interest, CEI lacks substantial variations over time. Therefore, FE may provide imprecise estimation 
(Wooldridge, 2002: p.286). In addition, FE is not supported in a small number of firms over a limited time period, 
which is the case of our study (n = 398 and t = 4) (Baltagi et al., 2005: p. 13). 
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(Firm size) has an average value of 4.078; ROA shows 6.177 mean value; and Leverage has an 
average value of 0.256. Tobin’s q has an average of 1.844; Insideown, a proxy for internal 
ownership, shows a mean value of 2.084%; and capex has an average of -0.043. Table 2A 
shows the number and percentage of firms offering workplace diversity policies. For instance, 
about 96% of firms (386 firms) have SONDP; 76% of firms (306 firms) have GINDP; DPB 
and TG are offered by 70% (281 firms) and 49% (198 firms) of firms respectively. In terms of 
the combination of policies, 76% of firms (303 firms) have both SONDP and GINDP; 59% of 
firms (236 firms) have both GINDP and DPB, and only 43% of firms (173 firms) have DPB 
and TG policies.  
[Insert Tables 2 and 2A about here] 
Table 3 shows the correlations among variables used in our regression model to check 
the multicollinearity problem. All the variables measuring workplace diversity are positively 
correlated with the innovation variable, providing support to our hypothesis. In our sample, the 
highest correlation is among CEI and dummy variables (SONDP, GINDP, DPB, and TG), 
highlighted in bold. As a general principle, a correlation higher than 0.70 may indicate a 
multicollinearity issue (Alam et al., 2019; Liu, Wei, & Xie, 2014). However, we used highly 
correlated variables in separate regressions, instead of simultaneously in a model, and 
therefore, high correlation among these variables is not an issue for our study. The remaining 
variables report no correlation coefficient value higher than 0.70. In addition, to test the 
potential effect of multicollinearity among these variables, we calculate the variance inflation 
factor (VIF).8 All the variables have a VIF of less than 1.35 and the overall mean value is 1.28.9 
This suggests that multicollinearity is not an issue in the model. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
                                                          
8
 We do not report VIF results in the interest of brevity. 
9
 Lardaro (1993) suggests that multicollinearity can cause an issue if VIF exceeds 10. 
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5 Results and discussion 
Main results: Workplace diversity policies and innovation 
We examined the impact of workplace diversity policies on firm innovation. Panel A in 
Table 4 presents the results of the baseline regressions using the OLS specification. We start 
our analysis (Column 1) by regressing the innovation (measured as the number of patents, 
trademarks, and copyrights granted) on the Corporate Equality Index (CEI, the umbrella 
measure) with industry and year effects. In Columns 2–5, we incorporate the measures of 
individual policies. For instance, Column 2 shows the effect of sexual orientation non-
discrimination (SONDP) policy; Column 3 illustrates the impact of gender identity non-
discrimination (GINDP) policy; Column 4 presents the impact of domestic partner benefits 
(DPB) policy; and Column 5 shows the effect of transgender (TG) policy on innovation. 
In all the regressions, results suggest that workplace diversity policies have a significantly 
positive impact on firm innovation at the 10% or better level of significance. In addition, 
individual policies also positively affect innovation. The economic significance is also 
important. For example, an increase in CEI score by one (sample) standard deviation (i.e., using 
Table 2), increases innovation by approximately 0.38% [CEI (37.738)×4.234/ PTC (420.425) 
= 0.380]. In summary, there is consistent and statistically strong evidence that workplace 
diversity policies have a significantly positive impact on innovation across all the regressions. 
Overall, these findings support our hypothesis. 
 For robustness, we use OLS and one-year lagged specification, without controlling for 
firm and governance characteristics. We report results in Panel B in Table 4. Our results suggest 
that the CEI and individual policies are positively and significantly associated with innovation 
across all the Columns (1–10).10 These findings further support our hypothesis. Overall, the 
                                                          
10
 We further apply restriction in our sample by including only those firms which have SONDP but not GINDP, 
DPB, or TG and run regression analysis. Our results remain consistent.  
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results confirm the imperative of Rawls’ theory that if the workforce is treated equally and 
provided with conducive environment, it creates value for the firm.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Robustness checks 
In this section, we perform a number of sensitivity checks to ensure the robustness of our 
results. We specify: (i) alternative variables to measure innovation in addition to PTC, 
including patents, trademarks, and copyrights scaled by number of employees in the firm 
(PTC/Emp), PTC scaled by sales turnover (PTC/Sales), log of total research and development 
expenditure (Ln_R&D), and research and development expenditure scaled by sales turnover 
(R&D/Sales); (ii) a different estimation technique (i.e. Tobit regression); (iii) excluding firm 
governance characteristics; and (iv) controlling for firm age and location, since both of these 
variables may affect firm equality policies depending on whether it is a new or established firm 
and the state location.11 
 Table 5 reports the results of the above-mentioned specifications based on Equation 1 in 
Panels A–D. The year and industry effects are included in all the regression specifications. We 
also include the control variables, as specified in Table 1, in all the regressions. We find that 
CEI is positively associated with innovation across the four panels.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Endogeneity bias 
Our results in the previous section may face critique for potential endogeneity bias, due 
to a causal effect of diversity policies on firm outcomes (i.e. innovation). For instance, in order 
to create a conducive and creative workplace environment, managers who are sensitive to the 
benevolent effect of corporate diversity may hire more LGBT employees by creating LGBT-
                                                          
11
 As a further robustness check, we also specify industry adjusted PTC, and industry adjusted sales turnover. Our 
results remain consistent. 
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supportive policies that may ultimately foster innovation. Moreover, innovative firms may be 
responsive to external and societal trends in accepting LGBT employees into their workforce. 
Therefore, our main independent variable (CEI) may suffer from bias, and as a result, may not 
be systematically associated with our dependent variable (PTC). In this section, we address 
endogeneity concerns using the following two approaches: propensity score matching (PSM), 
and a dynamic panel data estimation technique — Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). 
Propensity score matching  
We use the propensity score matching estimator method (PSM) (e.g. Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1983; Lennox, Francis, & Wang, 2013) to test the change in the dependent variable 
(innovation), as a result of workplace diversity policies. First, we estimate the probability that 
a firm is involved in the best practices of having workplace diversity (LGBT-supportive) 
policies. We run a logistic regression for CEI_dummy (that equals 1 when the CEI score is 
greater than mean value and 0 otherwise — we treat firms with 1 as part of the treatment group 
and those with 0 as the control group) with the same explanatory variables as specified in Table 
4 (i.e. Bsize, ROA, Leverage, etc.).12 Table 6 (Panel A) reports the pre-match logistic regression 
results. The pseudo R-square for the regression is high (0.221).  
We also use the nearest neighbor approach to ensure that firms in the treatment and 
control groups are sufficiently identical. Notably, each firm in the treatment group is matched 
to a firm in the control group with the closest propensity score. In the case of multiple matches, 
we retain the pair for which the difference between the propensity scores of the two firms is 
the smallest. We further require that the maximum difference between the propensity score of 
each firm and its matched peer does not exceed 0.1% in absolute value.13 
                                                          
12
 As a robustness measure, we use the median to form CEI_dummy. Our results remain consistent.  
13
 We allow firms to be matched to multiple firms by changing the permissible difference in propensity scores to 
1.0% and 0.5% in value, however we find consistent results (un-tabulated). 
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To verify that the firms in the treatment and groups are indistinguishable in terms of 
observable characteristics, we conduct two diagnostic tests. The first test consists of re-
estimating the logit model for the post-match sample. The results in post-match (Panel A in 
Table 6) suggest that no coefficient is statistically significant, indicating that there are no 
distinguishable trends between the two groups. Moreover, coefficients in post-match are 
smaller in magnitude than those in the pre-match column, indicating the decline in the degree 
of freedom in the restricted sample. Finally, the pseudo R-square declines from 0.221 to 0.027 
for the post-match sample. This suggests that propensity score matching removes all observable 
differences, other than the difference in the lower score for workplace diversity policies. The 
second test examines the differences in the mean of each observable characteristic between the 
treatment and the control firms. Panel B of Table 6 shows that none of the differences in the 
observable characteristics between the treatment and control groups are statistically 
significant.14 Overall, the diagnostic test suggests that the propensity score matching removes 
all of the observable differences in explanatory variables, other than CEI. 
We report propensity score matching estimates in Panel C (Table 6). The results show that 
there are significant differences (significant at the 1% level) in innovation between firms with 
LGBT-supportive policies and those without (symbolic). These findings suggest that an 
increase in innovation is attributable to the systematic difference in the workplace diversity 
policies. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Dynamic panel data estimation 
Second, we use dynamic panel estimation, which accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, 
simultaneity, and the dynamic relation between the CEI and past innovation (Wintoki, Linck, 
                                                          
14
 Mean difference between the treatment and the control group is based on the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT). 
20 | P a g e  
 
& Netter, 2012; Abdallah, Goergen, & O’Sullivan, 2015; Atif, Huang, & Liu, 2019). The two-
step ‘system GMM’ (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) uses first-differenced 
variables as instruments for the equations in levels.15 The estimations are robust to undetected 
heterogeneity, causality problems and dynamic endogeneity. The stability of the dynamic 
system GMM depends on two major conditions. The first condition is the serial independence 
of the residuals, where the first difference residuals should be serially correlated (AR1) by the 
means of their structure. However, residuals in the second difference should not be serially 
correlated (AR2). The second condition is the validity of instruments used in dynamic 
estimation. The Hansen J-statistic of over-identifying restrictions tests the null hypothesis of 
the instruments’ validity. The insignificance of the Hansen J-statistic indicates the validity of 
instruments in the respective estimations. Finally, the number of instruments (i.e. 20) used in 
the model is less than in the panel (i.e. 398), which adds to the consistency of the Hansen J-
statistic.  
The diagnostic test in Table 7 shows that the model is statistically well-fitted for first 
order autocorrelation (AR1), insignificant for second order autocorrelation (AR2), and for the 
Hansen J-statistic of over-identifying restrictions. The interpretation of the parameters on CEI 
and innovation remains quantitatively the same as in Table 4. For instance, CEI positively 
affects innovation. Hence, the system GMM supports our results, even after controlling for 
undetected heterogeneity, simultaneity bias and dynamic endogeneity.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Workplace diversity policies and firm performance 
In this section, we investigate whether workplace diversity policies affect a firm’s 
performance. If firms tend towards implementing LGBT-supportive policies, in line with 
                                                          
15 The system GMM estimations are based on (Roodman, 2006), using Stata module ‘xtabond2’. Refer to 
Roodman (2006) and Pathan (2009) for details on dynamic panel data estimations.  
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external and societal norms, then one may expect a positive impact on firm value and 
performance consistent with the responsible firm hypothesis. We measure firm performance 
using Tobin’s q and ROS (net income scaled by sales turnover) following prior studies (e.g., 
Liu et al., 2014). We estimate the following regression model to examine the impact of CEI 
and PTC on firm performance. 
%& ),
 =  + (_),
 + (),
 +
$(_ × ),
 + '(_ℎ ! !),
  +
#*(%&_ℎ ! !),
 + #.∑(! )) !) + #/∑(+ )) !)
 + ,,
          (2) 
The dependent variable in this equation (firm perf) is measured by Tobin’s q and ROS. The 
independent variables are the same as specified in Table 1 and discussed in the above sections, 
except for the interaction between innovation and diversity policies (Corporate_Equality × 
Innovation) which is the main variable of interest. Table 8 reports the results using OLS and 
one-year lagged specifications for Tobin’s q and ROS, respectively. The interaction term shows 
a positive effect on firm performance. These results suggest a positive effect of workplace 
diversity policies and innovation on firm performance, which is significant at the 5% or better 
level of significance. These findings suggest that LGBT-supportive policies have a positive 
impact on firms’ innovation that ultimately increases firm performance, indicating workplace 
diversity policies as one of the drivers of firm performance.   
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
6 Conclusion 
Innovation is an important function of both accounting and management because it is linked 
to business performance and serves to accommodate market uncertainties a firm may face in 
its competitive environment. In this paper, using HRC data for large US firms from 2011–2014, 
we investigate the effect of CEI score on firm innovation and find a significantly positive 
relationship. We also find a significantly positive relationship between individual anti-
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discriminatory policies and firm innovation. More specifically, we show that workplace 
diversity policies positively affect firm innovation, which ultimately leads to higher firm 
performance. Our findings are robust to alternative econometric specifications, alternative 
measures of innovation, and to individual policies. In a finer analysis, propensity score 
matching (PSM), and dynamic panel data estimation (system GMM), we further strengthen our 
finding that workplace diversity policies have a positive causal effect on innovation, and that 
these results are not due to omitted variables or causality issues. We have used Rawls’ Theory 
of Justice (1971) to argue that firms have a greater ethical imperative to advance fairness and 
meritocratic values among employees and society at large. In addition, we have used the 
imperative of stakeholder theory to argue that LGBT-supportive policies in the firms are an 
important part of workplace diversity management, which should be communicated to all 
stakeholders. 
Our paper has important implications not only for firms’ workplace strategies, but also for 
developing diversity policies aimed at increasing innovation that may ultimately lead to better 
firm performance. The implications of our study are based on macro (overall CEI score) and 
micro (individual diversity policies) perspectives. Our results suggest that adoption of anti-
discriminatory policies that aim to provide equal employment opportunities can have real 
economic benefits in terms of higher innovation and higher firm performance. Our findings are 
timely and important because, in the U.S., there is an ongoing debate around banning sexual 
orientation discrimination in the workplace across the country. Our findings may also trigger 
debate in similar markets around the globe to enhance disclosure on firms’ LGBT workplace 
policies to gain comparable economic benefits. 
Like most research, our study is subject to potential limitations. In particular, it is 
limited to a consideration of large firms in the U.S. This focus limits the ability to generalize 
to small firms and those outside the U.S., or not-for-profit organizations. Future studies may 
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investigate this issue in the context of different types of organizations, and may shift the focus 
towards other developed or developing countries, since workplace diversity policies are 
increasingly advocated around the globe.  
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Table 1. Variables definitions 
 
Notation Variable name Measure 
Panel A: Innovation 
PTC Patents, trademark and copyrights Total patents, trademarks, and copyrights issued in a year 
PTC/Emp Patents, trademark and copyrights per 
employee 
Total patents, trademarks, and copyrights issued in a year divided by number of employees 
PTC/Sales Patents, trademark and copyrights per sale Total patents, trademarks, and copyrights issued in a year divided by total sales turnover 
Ln_R&D Research and development Natural log of total research and development expenditure 
R&D/Sales Research and development per sales Total research and development expenditures divided by total sales turnover 
Panel B: Corporate equality 
CEI Corporate equality index The score ranging from 0 to 100 with 100 being the top score based on firm treatment of individuals within the LGBT community 
employees 
SONDP Sexual orientation non-discrimination policy A dummy variable equals 1 if firm has a sexual orientation non-discrimination policy and 0 otherwise 
GINDP Gender-identity non-discrimination policy A dummy variable equals 1 if firm has a gender-identity non-discrimination policy and 0 otherwise 
DPB Domestic partner benefits A dummy variable equals 1 if firm offers domestic partner benefits to its LGBT constituents and 0 otherwise 
TG Transgender insurance A dummy variable equals 1 if firm offers health benefits to transgender employees and 0 otherwise 
Panel C: Corporate governance 
Bsize Board size The total number of directors on the firm’s board 
Duality CEO duality A dummy variable equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise 
Bind Board independence The number of independent directors divided by the board size 
Ln_bmeeting Board meetings Log of the number of board meetings held in a year 
Panel D: Firm characteristics 
Firm size Size of firm Natural log of total assets 
ROA Return on assets Firm net income divided by total assets 
Leverage Leverage The sum of short- and long-term debt divided by total assets 
Tobin's q Growth opportunities Market value of equity divided the book value of equity 
Insideown Insider ownership The percentage of share held by insiders in total outstanding capital 
Capex Capital expenditure Total capital expenditures divided by total assets 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
   
Variable  N Mean Std. Dev. 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
Panel A: Innovation  
   
PTC 1592 420.425 2030.575 0 0 119.500 
Panel B: Corporate equality  
   
CEI 1592 58.222 37.738 15 65 100 
SONDP 1592 0.889 0.314 1 1 1 
GINDP 1592 0.606 0.489 0 1 1 
DPB 1592 0.628 0.483 0 1 1 
TG 1592 0.321 0.467 0 0 1 
Panel C: Corporate governance  
   
Bsize 1561 11.051 2.019 10 11 12 
Duality 1549 0.547 0.498 0 1 1 
Bind 1592 82.322 15.488 80 88.889 90.909 
Ln_bmeeting 1592 7.962 3.560 6 7 10 
Panel D: Firm characteristics  
   
Firm size 1579 4.078 0.480 3.782 4.023 4.323 
ROA 1570 6.177 6.177 2.296 5.24 9.325 
Leverage 1577 0.256 0.219 0.118 0.225 0.360 
Tobin's q 1561 1.844 1.094 1.146 1.501 2.111 
Insideown 1592 2.084 4.384 0.312 0.642 1.708 
Capex 1577 -0.043 0.053 -0.058 -0.029 -0.013 
Table 2A. Descriptive statistics of workplace policies 
  
Variable  No. of firms % of firms  
   
SONDP 386 0.960  
   
GINDP 306 0.760  
   
DPB 281 0.700  
   
TG 198 0.490  
   
SONDP and GINDP 303 0.760  
   
GINDP and DPB 236 0.590  
   
DPB and TG 173 0.430  
   
Tables 2 and 2A present the descriptive statistics. Refer Table 1 for variables definitions.  
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Table 3. Correlation matrix                
  Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 PTC 1.000                
2 CEI 0.128 1.000               
3 SONDP 0.051 0.527 1.000              
4 GINDP 0.105 0.828 0.415 1.000             
5 DPB 0.105 0.864 0.423 0.646 1.000            
6 TG 0.109 0.703 0.231 0.540 0.485 1.000           
7 Bsize 0.092 0.214 0.117 0.160 0.181 0.136 1.000          
8 Duality 0.076 0.061 0.024 0.038 0.043 0.041 0.049 1.000         
9 Bind 0.060 0.140 0.083 0.096 0.167 0.069 0.110 0.173 1.000        
10 Ln_bmeeting 0.055 0.106 0.044 0.069 0.068 0.143 0.127 -0.023 0.175 1.000       
11 Firm size 0.205 0.244 0.150 0.173 0.181 0.240 0.344 0.155 0.098 0.091 1.000      
12 ROA 0.036 -0.005 -0.021 -0.018 0.007 0.019 -0.124 0.003 -0.068 -0.263 0.006 1.000     
13 Leverage 0.002 -0.091 0.056 -0.087 -0.053 -0.088 0.022 -0.028 -0.050 0.026 -0.066 -0.004 1.000    
14 Tobin's q 0.028 0.051 -0.026 0.045 0.067 0.010 -0.161 -0.010 -0.096 -0.231 -0.116 0.486 0.204 1.000   
15 Insideown -0.052 -0.010 -0.019 0.002 -0.021 0.023 -0.098 -0.103 -0.284 -0.098 -0.149 -0.008 -0.003 0.062 1.000  
16 Capex 0.049 0.114 0.004 0.062 0.091 0.114 0.098 -0.050 0.043 0.070 0.001 -0.052 -0.151 -0.044 -0.009 1.000 
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix. Refer Table 1 for variables definitions. 
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Table 4 Workplace diversity policies and innovation   
Variable PTC 
Panel A 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
CEI 4.234***     
 (2.698)     
SONDP  167.841*    
  (1.985)    
GINDP   303.389***   
   (2.658)   
DPB    251.708**  
    (2.145)  
TG     273.557** 
     (2.253) 
Bsize 16.916 23.931 18.985 19.842 23.157 
 (0.596) (0.846) (0.671) (0.700) (0.820) 
Duality 227.220** 241.226** 231.548** 236.867** 236.421** 
 (2.100) (2.227) (2.141) (2.189) (2.185) 
Bind 4.580 6.253 5.296 4.614 5.772 
 (0.776) (1.064) (0.901) (0.777) (0.983) 
Ln_bmeeting 17.571 21.161 18.929 19.917 16.489 
 (1.069) (1.290) (1.154) (1.215) (0.998) 
Firm size 559.639*** 632.386*** 586.689*** 596.459*** 576.474*** 
 (4.425) (5.123) (4.719) (4.787) (4.564) 
ROA 7.608 5.503 7.966 6.675 5.786 
 (0.627) (0.453) (0.656) (0.550) (0.477) 
Leverage -209.622 -283.986 -206.062 -240.680 -236.763 
 (-0.814) (-1.099) (-0.800) (-0.936) (-0.920) 
Tobin's q -15.777 6.440 -13.403 -9.428 -3.215 
 (-0.223) (0.091) (-0.189) (-0.133) (-0.046) 
Insideown -5.980 -4.217 -5.437 -5.125 -6.031 
 (-0.479) (-0.338) (-0.436) (-0.410) (-0.482) 
Capex 1299.188 1165.873 1336.538 1281.109 1167.524 
 (1.184) (1.061) (1.217) (1.166) (1.065) 
Constant -729.857*** -158.642*** -877.784*** -858.258*** -751.883*** 
 (-3.163) (-3.708) (-3.365) (-3.322) (-3.173) 
Industry effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1528 1528 1528 1528 1528 
Adj. R-sq 0.189 0.195 0.198 0.187 0.188 
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Variable PTC 
Panel B 
OLS 
(1) 
Lagged 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
Lagged 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
Lagged 
(6) 
OLS 
(7) 
Lagged 
(8) 
OLS 
(9) 
Lagged 
(10) 
CEI 6.402*** 5.635***         
 (4.550) (4.113)         
SONDP   306.882* 267.675*       
   (1.902) (1.669)       
GINDP     422.472*** 354.685***     
     (3.952) (3.377)     
DPB       388.083*** 375.059***   
       (3.563) (3.530)   
TG         441.072*** 365.387*** 
         (3.955) (3.310) 
Constant 628.803** -169.758 1166.111** -48.687 1167.429** -87.797 968.733* -167.019 986.305* -29.615 
 (2.032) (-0.341) (2.248) (-0.090) (2.315) (-0.171) (1.917) (-0.331) (1.959) (-0.060) 
Industry effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1592 1591 1592 1591 1592 1591 1592 1591 1592 1591 
Adj. R-sq 0.261 0.258 0.210 0.249 0.257 0.241 0.255 0.219 0.271 0.154 
This table presents the regression results of model (1): 
,
 =  + (_),
 + (_ℎ ! !),
  + #$(%&_ℎ ! !),
 + #'∑(! )) !) + #*∑(+ )) !)
 + ,,
  
where innovation is measured by patents, trademarks and copyrights grants (PTC). Corporate Equality Index (CEI) is a measure of diversity policies published by Human Rights Campaign (HRC). 
Panel A Columns 1 presents the results of CEI on innovation. Columns 2 -5 present the results of corporate equality individual policies effect on innovation. Panel B shows the using OLS and 
one-year lagged variables on innovation without including control variables. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Standardized beta coefficients are reported.  ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1.
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Table 5. Robustness analysis 
     
Variable PTC PTC/Emp PTC/Sales Ln_R&D R&D/Sales 
Panel A      
OLS regression (N = 1,592)      
CEI 4.234*** 0.005** 0.001*** 0.089*** 0.020*** 
 (2.698) (2.040) (3.714) (4.001) (2.301) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B      
Tobit regression (N = 1,592)      
CEI 9.017*** 0.001* 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.0403** 
 (3.004) (1.990) (3.640) (3.167) (2.231) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel C      
Excluding governance characteristics (N = 1,592)      
CEI 3.722*** 0.002* 0.001*** 0.009*** 0.021*** 
 (2.514) (1.921) (3.871) (4.572) (4.660) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel D      
Controlling for firm age, and location (N = 1,592)      
CEI 3.872** 0.013** 0.010*** 0.019** 0.019** 
 (2.164) (2.040) (2.543) (2.020) (2.011) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table presents the results of robustness analyses using alternative variables, alternative method, excluding corporate governance variables, and controlling for firm age and location in four 
panels (A-D). Industry and year effects are included in all the regressions. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Standardized beta coefficients are reported. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1.
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Table 6. Propensity score matching  
Panel A Pre-match Post-match 
Variable CEI_dummy 
Bsize 0.160*** 0.004 
 (4.493) (0.143) 
Duality 0.319** -0.078 
 (2.462) (-0.692) 
Bind 0.031*** 0.008 
 (4.222) (1.229) 
Ln_bmeeting 0.064*** 0.029 
 (3.054) (1.728) 
Firm size 1.320*** 0.269 
 (8.264) (1.125) 
ROA -0.056*** 0.012 
 (-3.647) (1.051) 
Leverage -1.202*** -0.064 
 (-3.546) (-0.209) 
Tobin's q 0.474*** 0.103 
 (5.131) (1.511) 
Insideown 0.022 0.001 
 (1.397) (0.074) 
Capex -3.377** -4.499 
 (-2.391) (-1.710) 
Constant -9.680*** -1.906 
 (-9.219) (-1.725) 
Industry effects Y Y 
Year effects Y Y 
N 1,528 828 
Pseudo R-sq 0.221 0.027 
 
Panel B: Difference in firm characteristics   
Variable Treatment Control Difference t-stat 
Bsize 11.464 11.158 0.306 1.991 
Duality 0.584 0.608 -0.024 -0.611 
Bind 85.532 85.192 0.341 0.441 
Ln_bmeeting 8.413 8.071 0.341 1.360 
Firm size 4.174 4.122 0.052 1.450 
ROA 6.186 5.916 0.270 0.510 
Leverage 0.234 0.236 -0.001 -0.070 
Tobin's q 1.916 2.108 -0.191 -1.160 
Insideown 1.995 2.087 -0.091 -0.240 
Capex -0.038 -0.043 0.004 1.240 
     
Panel C: Propensity score estimator    
Variable Treatment Control Difference t-stat 
PTC 653.386 426.312 227.074*** 2.139 
The table presents the results of endogeneity test, propensity score matching in three panels. Panel A shows the pre-match- 
and post-match results and Panel B presents the difference in firm characteristics for the matched sample and Panel C reports 
propensity score estimators. Standardized beta coefficients are reported.  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
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Table 7. Generalized Method of Moments 
Variable PTC 
CEI 11.144** 
 (2.091) 
Bsize -19.273 
 (-1.232) 
Duality 165.640 
 (1.463) 
Bind -17.379 
 (-0.245) 
Ln_bmeeting -1.926 
 (-0.014) 
Firm size 16.526* 
 (1.885) 
ROA 4.575 
 (0.068) 
Leverage 141.283* 
 (1.945) 
Tobin's q -33.533 
 (-1.181) 
Insideown -30.094 
 (-0.168) 
Capex 115.934** 
 (1.979) 
Constant 182.985 
 (0.029) 
Industry effects Y 
Year effects Y 
N 1528 
Model fits  
AR I 0.176*** 
 (2.860) 
AR II 0.125 
 (0.550) 
Wald F-statistics 16.100*** 
 (0.030) 
No. of instruments 20 
Hansen J-statistic 2.271 
  (0.518) 
The table presents the results of dynamic panel data estimation (system GMM). Industry and year effects are included in the 
regression. Standardized beta coefficients are reported.  ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
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Table 8. Workplace diversity policies, innovation, and firm performance  
Variable Tobin's q Lagged Tobin's q ROS Lagged ROS 
CEI 0.001* 0.003*** 0.002** 0.013** 
 (1.990) (5.110) (2.190) (2.005) 
PTC 0.001** 0.001** 1.320** -1.200 
 (2.110) (2.041) (2.190) (0.090) 
CEI × PTC 1.320** 1.220*** 1.580** 3.001** 
 (2.181) (2.480) (2.120) (2.105) 
Bsize -0.088*** -0.044*** 0.006 0.001 
 (-7.010) (-3.540) (0.530) (0.081) 
Duality 0.018 0.058 -0.008 0.004 
 (0.038) (1.220) (-0.180) (0.670) 
Bind -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001* 
 (-0.001) (-0.900) (-0.720) (-0.600) 
Ln_bmeeting -0.047*** -0.020*** 0.001*** 0.001* 
 (-6.790) (-2.730) (2.410) (1.192) 
Firm size -0.913*** -0.303*** -0.087*** -0.086*** 
 (-13.921) (-5.530) (-12.250) (-9.660) 
ROA 0.201*** 0.120*** 0.011*** 0.006*** 
 (9.109) (14.130) (20.73) (9.791) 
Leverage 0.833*** 1.240*** 0.074*** 0.066*** 
 (7.651) (11.160) (6.570) (4.661) 
Tobin's q   -0.017*** -0.001 
 
  (-5.380) (-0.013) 
Insideown -0.004 0.008 0.001** 0.001 
 (-0.080) (1.640) (2.130) (1.540) 
Capex -0.628 0.883* -0.036 -0.517 
 (-1.131) (1.960) (-0.760) (-0.849) 
Constant 5.001*** 2.712*** 1.054** 0.385*** 
 (10.970) (9.071) (2.042) (6.930) 
Industry effects Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
N 1528 1327 1528 1327 
Adj. R-sq 0.380 0.423 0.440 0.344 
This table presents the results of innovation, CEI (interaction term), and firm performance measured by Tobin’s q and ROS as 
dependant variables using OLS and one-year lagged specifications respectively. Industry and year effects are included in all 
the regressions. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Standardized beta coefficients are reported. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All control variables are defined in Table 1. 
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